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Stoffa: Appeal and Error - The Omnipotent Wyoming Supreme Court: New Alle

APPEAL AND ERROR-The Omnipotent Wyoming Supreme Court:
New Allegations and Evidence Will Be Heard for the First Time
on Appeal. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184 (Wyo.
1992).
The four members of Western Law Associates, P.C. and John
L. Vidakovich (the Association) were lawyers. 1 The Association
founded the Yellowstone National Bank, served as the bank's principal
officers, managed the bank, and were the bank's attorneys. 2 In 1983
the Association persuaded Lewis Boller and Alice Nicholas to become
directors of the Yellowstone National Bank. 3 The Association served
as attorneys for Lewis Boller and Alice Nicholas regarding bank
matters .4
As a result of new federal banking standards, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) closed the Yellowstone National
Bank on November 1, 1985.1 As the appointed receiver of the bank,
the F.D.I.C. became responsible for preserving bank property. 6 Three
years later, the F.D.I.C. sued Lewis Boiler and Alice Nicholas alleging
that actions of the directors caused the failure of the bank. 7 Mr.
Boller and Alice Nicholas then brought third-party claims against the
Association.' They asserted that any action of the directors leading
to the failure of the bank was a result of negligence by the Association. 9
Specifically, Mr. Boller and Mrs. Nicholas alleged that the Association
failed to provide proper legal advice and guidance.' 0 The trial judge
granted the Association's Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motion" to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 12 No answers had

1. Board of Professional Responsibility v. Vidakovich, 816 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1991). The

court held that disbarment was an appropriate sanction for an attorney who had been convicted
of three felonies, involving misapplication of funds, false entry in bank records and obstruction
of justice.
2. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Wyoming Supreme Court at 3,
Boller v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184 (Wyo. 1992) (No. 90-84) [hereinafter Petition
for Cert.]
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Wyo. 1992). Petition for
Cert., supra note 2, at 6.
6. Petition for Cert., supra note 2.
7. Id. at 3. Because of an indemnification agreement between the directors and the bank,
the bank was liable for any damages recovered against Boller and Nicholas. Therefore, the
F.D.I.C. as the bank's receiver was essentially suing itself. The case was non-suited.
8. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Wyo. 1992).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides:

(b)... Every defense, in law or fact to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may
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been filed.'" No evidence was received.' 4 There was no trial."5 Lewis6
Boller and Alice Nicholas appealed to the Wyoming Stlpreme Court.
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's grant
of the motion to dismiss the third-party claims for failure to state
a claim." However, the decision was not based on a failure to present
elements of negligence sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.
Rather, the court held that based on the statute of limitations for
professional malpractice, Wyoming Statutes section 1-3-107, the thirdparty claims were time barred. 8 The allegation that the statute of
limitations had run was raised for the first time on appeal. '9
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Boiler destroyed the
doctrine forbidding consideration of new allegations and evidence for
the first time on appeal. Before the Boiler decision, the Wyoming
Supreme Court did not receive new allegations or new evidence on
appeal, unless they went to jurisdiction or other fundamental matters. 20
According to Justice Thomas, hearing the statute of limitations
allegation for the first time on appeal and deciding the case based
on the new allegation was contrary to precedent that had served the
Wyoming Supreme Court and justice in an exemplary fashion for
many years. 2'
The new rule allowing allegations to be heard for the first time
on appeal has many dangerous aspects. First, this casenote discusses
the history of the rule forbidding consideration of new allegations
and evidence for the first time on appeal and examines the Boiler

at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted ....
W.R.C.P. 12
12. Boiler, 828 P.2d at 1184.
13. Petition for Cert., supra note 2, at 4.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Boiler, 828 P.2d at 1184 The third-party claims were appealed independent of the
underlying action brought by the F.D.I.C. As an independent appeal, the case became Boiler
v. Western Law Associates.
17. Id. at 1185.
18. WYO. STAT. §1-3-107 (1988) provides:

(a) A cause of action arising from an act error or omission in the rendering of licensed
or certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater
of the following times: (i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2)
years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission was: (A) Not reasonably
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or (B) That the claimant failed to discover
the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period despite the exercise
of due diligence.
19. Boiler, 828 P.2d at 1186.
20. Esponda v. Esponda, 796 P.2d 799, 802 (Wyo. 1990).
21. Boller v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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opinion. Then, the casenote analyzes the dangers created by hearing
new allegations on appeal. Finally, this casenote concludes that
allowing allegations to be heard for the first time on appeal is
incompatible with the current Wyoming judicial system.
BACKGROUND

The principle that new allegations or evidence will not be heard
on appeal has a long and uniform history of application in the United
States. The principle was derived from the pre-19th century English
Common Law practice of review under the writ of error.22 A writ of
error did not continue the suit; rather, it commenced a new suit.23
Because all questions of fact had been decided by the jury in the
initial suit, only questions of law were brought before the reviewing
24

court.
The English Chancery courts handled review differently. Rarely,
after a Chancery court had issued a decree, were rehearings allowed.
Rehearings were sometimes called appeals. 2 At a rehearing, the Lord
Chancellor permitted the parties to present new evidence. 26 From the
Lord Chancellor's decree, appeal to the House of Lords was al2
lowed.2 7 The Lords did not consider new allegations or evidence.
In the modern American court system, the principle that no new
allegations or evidence may be brought on review continues to exist.
This principle was originally derived from the English writ of error
procedure. 29 Contrary to the distinction in England, both the Common Law courts and the Chancery courts in the States applied this
principle.30 The terms writ of error and appeal were used interchangeably." Writs of error might be heard in the Chancery courts
and appeals could be heard in the Common Law courts.12 Regardless
of the name used, both courts followed the writ of error procedure
and no new evidence or allegations were allowed. 3
22. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 820 (1970).
23. For an in-depth description of the history of new allegations and proof on appeal,
See Robert W. Millar, New Allegation and Proof on Appeal in Anglo-American Civil Procedure, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 427 (1952).
24. Id. at 428.
25. Id. (from BoHutr, CuRsus CANCELLARIAE 403 (2d ed. 1723)).
26. Id. at 429 (from 2 J. S. SMITH, PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY *33-*34 (lst
Am. ed. 1839 from 2d London ed. 1837); 1 HARIMSON, PRIACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
(8th ed. 1796), at 436-438; 2 MADDOCK, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
483 (2d ed. 1820).
27. Id. (from I HARRISON, PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY, (8th ed. 1796) at
454.
28. Id.
29. Roscoe Pound, Appeal and Error-New Evidence in the Appellate Court, 56 HARv.
L. REV. 1313 (1943).
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. ld.
33. Id.
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Eventually, the American Common Law and Chancery courts
merged. With the New York Code of Procedure of 1848, New York
consolidated administration of its Common Law courts and Chancery
courts. 4 Under the New York Code, review followed the writ of error
procedure, but was
called an appeal.3" Other states soon followed
36
New York's lead.
Appeals in state courts are for the purpose of resolving questions
of law." For that reason, state courts of review do not receive new
allegations or evidence. If new allegations or evidence were allowed,
then state courts of review would be assuming the role of the fact
finder. A strong tradition of distrust of judges has made the jury the
preferred finder of fact and a sacrosanct institution in our legal system.38
Traditionally, Wyoming has recognized the role of the jury and
has strongly adhered to the principle of not allowing new allegations
or evidence on appeal. In the modern era, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has embraced this doctrine. In 1931, the Wyoming Supreme

Court decided Ideal Bakery v. Schryver.3 9 In Ideal, the plaintiff in
error raised the allegation that, in her case, application of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation statute violated the Wyoming and U.S.
Constitutions. She raised this issue for the first time on appeal. Justice
Riner noted that the court did not have to address the issue at all
"under the rule that questions not raised below will not ordinarily
be considered."40
In a 1945 case, Gore v. John,4' Chief Justice Blume stated the
rule exactly, "It is a rule of almost universal application that with
the exception of such matter as jurisdiction or other fundamental
matters 42 the supreme court will not consider any questions which
have not been considered by the district court. ' 4 Since this pro-

34. Robert W. Millar, New Allegation and Proof on Appeal in Anglo-American Civil
Procedure, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 427, 432 (1952).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. This case was brought when the idea of workers' compensation was new. Workers'
compensation statutes across the nation were being challenged as unconstitutional. Because the.
plaintiff failed to raise the issue of constitutionality in the lower court, she tried to raise it
on appeal. Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 299 P. 284 (Wyo. 1931).
40. Id. at 293.
41. Gore v. John, 157 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1945).
42. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 655 (1962). What the court appears to mean
by fundamental matters is error affecting fundamental rights. Under a liberal view of appellate
review, some courts consider it to be within their appellate power to review questions of jurisdiction and fundamental rights, absent an assignment of error. See State v. Apodaca, 82
P.2d 641 (N.M. 1938); State v. Stenback, 2 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1931).
43. Gore v. John, 157 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1945).
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nouncement, forty-three other Wyoming Supreme Court opinions have
reiterated and maintained this rule of procedure for review."
Recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court has emphatically stated
and applied this rule. In Squaw Mountain Cattle Company v. Bowen,
a 1991 case, Justice Cardine said,
"[w]e do not address issues raised
'4
for the first time on appeal."
In another 1991 case, Epple v. Clark, Justice Golden wrote, "This
court has taken a dim view of a litigant trying a case on one theory
and appealing it on another. Further, we will not consider for the
first time on appeal an issue neither raised nor argued to the trial
court."46
This rule has been frequently addressed in Wyoming over the
last forty-seven years. 47 With the exceptions of jurisdiction and other
similar fundamental matters, the Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently refused to consider allegations or evidence for the first time
on appeal.48 Under this rule, the court reserves its efficacy for re-

44. See, Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1991); Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v.
Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292 (Wyo. 1991); Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1991); Esponda v.
Esponda, 796 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1990); Matter of Estate of McCue, 776 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 1989);
Ricci v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 721 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1986); White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102
(Wyo. 1984); Dennis v. Dennis, 675 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1984); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v.
Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1983); Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp.,
665 P.2d 452 (Wyo. 1983); U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121 (Wyo.
1983); Matter of Altman's Estate, 650 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1982); Matter of Parental Rights of
PP, 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982); ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981);
City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection Ass'n, 610 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1980); Nickelson v.
People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980); Matter of State Bank Charter Application of Sec. Bank,
Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296 (Wyo. 1980); Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979); Schaefer
v. Lampert Lumber Co., 591 P.2d 1225 (Wyo. 1979); Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841 (Wyo.
1979); Merritt v. Merritt, 586 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1978); Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Pauli, 565
P.2d 835 (Wyo. 1977); Zwick v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 556 P.2d 508 (Wyo. 1976); Knudson
v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1976); Mader v.
James, 546 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1976); Pritchard v. State, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation,
Dept. of Health and Social Services, 540 P.2d 523 (Wyo. 1975); Oedekoven v. Oedekoven,
538 P.2d 1292 (Wyo. 1975); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1974);
Karns v. Karns, 511 P.2d 955 (Wyo. 1973); Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 502 P.2d 362 (Wyo.
1972); Guggenmos v. Tom Searl-Frank McCue, Inc., 481 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1971); Steffens v.
Smith, 477 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1970); Beckle v. Beckle, 452 P.2d 205 (Wyo. 1969); Gerdom v.

Gerdom, 444 P.2d 34 (Wyo. 1968); Moore v. Kondziela, 405 P.2d 788 (Wyo. 1965); Matter
of Bridger Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 401 P.2d 289 (Wyo. 1965); Thickman v. Schunk,
391 P.2d 939 (Wyo. 1964); Rayburne v. Queen, 76 Wyo. 393, 306 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1957);
Strom v. Felton, 302 P.2d 917 (Wyo. 1956); Application of Northern Utilities Co., 247 P.2d
767 (Wyo. 1952); Gaido v. Tysdal, 235 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1951); Dulaney v. Jensen, 181 P.2d
605 (Wyo. 1947).
45. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Wyo. 1991).
46. Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1991).
47. Given the number of cases cited, one is justified in believing that the Wyoming
Supreme Court had adopted the rule.
48. See, e.g., Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 299 P. 284 (Wyo. 1931).
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viewing questions of law. The trial court hears allegations, and a jury
of one's peers makes findings of fact. 49 Nevertheless, the court ignored these separate and independent roles in Boiler.
PRINCPAL CASE

In Boiler v. Western Law Associates, the Wyoming Supreme Court
addressed whether Lewis Boller and Alice Nicholas had failed to state
a claim.50 The trial court found that Boller and Nicholas failed to
state a claim for professional malpractice and granted the Association's motion to dismiss."' The Wyoming Supreme Court did not address issues relative to presentation of the elements of negligence .
Rather, the court found that the statute of limitations barred the
53
claim.
The majority explained when the statute of limitations began to
run. The court cited Mills v. Garlow for the proposition that "Wyoming is a 'discovery' state, which means the statute of limitations is
not triggered until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know the
existence of the cause of action."3' 4 The court equated "reason to
know" with "reasonably discoverable"." Thus, when Boiler and Nicholas actually knew of the negligent acts was not important.5 6 However, when the negligent acts were reasonably discoverable was
important."
The court found that "due diligence" on the part of Boiler and
Nicholas would have required an investigation of why the bank was
closed. 5 According to the court, if the attorney's negligence had been
a factor contributing to the bank's closing, then Boiler and Nicholas
would have discovered the malpractice upon ascertaining the reasons

49. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 3 (1962).
50. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Wyo. 1992).
51. Id.at 1184.
52. Id. at 1185.
53. Id.at 1188.
54. Id. at 1185 (quoting Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 1989)(emphasis added).
55. Id. at 1186 (Wyo. 1992). The court argued that if an injury becomes reasonably
discoverable, then there is reason to know of the injury. However, because an injury is reasonably discoverable does not mean that the injured has any reason to know of the injury.
For example, in this case, even if the malpractice was reasonably discoverable within two years
of the bank being closed, Lewis Boller and Alice Nicholas did not have any reason to know
they had been injured until the F.D.I.C. initiated its suit. By analogy, if a surgical clamp is
left inside of a person, then it is reasonably discoverable by an X-ray at any time immediately
following the completion of surgery. However, the person may not discover the clamp until
the injury manifests itself (through unexplained pain, etc.). This manifestation, triggering the
discovery, may occur at a point in time greater than the limitations period after the date of
surgery. Under the court's interpretation of the discovery rule, the malpractice action against
the surgeon should be barred, because the negligence was discoverable immediately following
the surgery.
56. Id.at 1185.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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for the bank's closure.5 9 Therefore, the majority made a factual
determination6W that the malpractice was reasonably discoverable at
61
the time the bank closed or within a few months thereafter. The
court concluded that the statute of limitations was triggered on November 1, 1985, the day the bank closed. 62 Boiler and Nicholas filed
their claim on August 19, 1989.63 Therefore, the court determined
that the two-year statute of limitations had run.64
The majority was not persuaded by Boiler and Nicholas' argument that the statute of limitations defense should not be considered,
because it was raised for the first time on appeal. 65 The court noted
that W.R.C.P. 8 requires that "in pleading to a preceding pleading6
a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations. '"
Nonetheless, the court held the defense applicable. Although the Association did not affirmatively plead the statute of limitations defense,
the court found that the defense appeared on the face of the complaint.6 7 The majority employed the antiquated doctrine that if the
defense appears on the face of the complaint, then the complaint is
subject to a demurrer. 68 The court explained that the doctrine applies
to the demurrer's successor, the motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. 69 Because Boller and Nicholas appealed the lower court's
grant of a motion to dismiss, and the court found the statute of
limitations defense on the face of the complaint, the court allowed
presentation of the statute of limitations issue for the first time on
appeal.
Further, the court declared a "practical" reason for addressing
the statute of limitations issue. According to the majority, judicial
economy dictated addressing the statute of limitations issue. 70 The
court hypothesized a scenario where it granted Boiler and Lewis leave

59. Id. at 1186.
60. The court resolves a fact question. Fact questions are those issues which concern
facts or events and whether such occurred and how they occurred. Fact questions are for the
jury. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 593 (6th ed. 1991).

61. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184 (Wyo. 1992).
62. Id. at 1185.

63. Id.at 1186.
64. Id.at 1187. Approximately three years and ten months had elapsed from the date
which the court found triggered the statute of limitations and the date the complaint was filed
by Boiler and Nicholas.
65. Id.at 1186. The court also addressed the procedural issue of whether a statute of
limitations defense may be considered under a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. The court found that it was appropriate to consider the statute of limitations
under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
66. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).
67. Id. The court uses the date the bank was closed (November I, 1985) and the date
the complaint was filed (August 9, 1989) to determine that the two-year statue of limitations
had run. The dates appear in the complaint or on its face.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1187.
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to amend their complaint or found that the claim withstood the motion to dismiss. 71 Under the hypothetical, the Association would file
an answer raising the statute of limitations defense. The trial court
would then find for the Association based on this defense.7 2 The propriety of the statute of limitations would be an issue raised on a
second appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court. 73 Based on this hypothetical, the court reasoned that it was more efficient to address
the statute of limitations issue for the first time on appeal.7 4 Upon
addressing this issue, the court found that the statute of limitations
operated to bar Lewis Boiler and Alice Nicholas' attorney malpractice

claims .71
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Macy, dissented. Justice
Thomas perceived the statute of limitations as a non-issue. He argued
that the statute of limitations was an affirmative defense that must
be raised in the pleadings. 76 Otherwise, the defense was waived. Because the Association did not plead the defense, they waived it. Accould recover even
cording to Justice Thomas, Boiler and Nicholas
77
if the period of limitations had expired.
Next, Justice Thomas objected to the majority's decision to hear
the statute of limitations issue. He criticized the majority for disregarding the long-standing rule forbidding consideration of issues
that are raised for the first time on appeal .78 Justice Thomas further
argued that judicial economy as a policy reason was not strong enough
to support an action directly contravening "precedent that has served
this court and79 the interests of justice in an exemplary fashion for
many years."
Also, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's interpretation
of the discovery rule. He stated the same proposition as the majority,
"Wyoming is a 'discovery state' which means that the statute of lim-

71. Id. The court does not characterize these future actions as hypothetical. Rather, the
court believes the events necessarily will occur. Because the Wyoming Supreme Court cannot
know what will happen in the future, this author refers to these future events as hypothetical.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1188.
76. Boiler v. Western Law Associates. 828 P. 2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
77. Justice Thomas would have held that the complaint adequately stated a claim and

remanded the case to the trial court. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1190
(Wyo.1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (citing Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292 (Wyo. 1991); Epple
v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1991); Esponda v. Esponda, 796 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1990); U.S.
Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1983); Roush v. Roush, 589
P.2d 841 (Wyo. 1979); Thickman v. Schunk, 391 P.2d 939 (Wyo. 1964); Gore v. John, 157
P.2d 552 (Wyo. 1945); Ideal Bakery v. Schryver, 299 P. 284 (1931)).
79. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo..1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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itations is not triggered until the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know the existence of the cause of action. ' ' 0 However, Justice Thomas
interpreted this language to mean that the statute of limitations is
triggered when plaintiffs have an actual reason to know of the injury."' The statute of limitations is not triggered because the injury
is discoverable. Under this interpretation, and given the lack of evidence, Justice Thomas commented, "Neither the Wyoming Supreme
Court nor the trial court, other than by conjecture and assumption,
or
has any real capacity to ascertain whether 'the plaintiff kn[ew]
2
ha[d] reason to know the existence of the cause of action."' 8
Justice Thomas then stated the standard of review for motions
to dismiss. The motion can only be sustained when it is clear on the
face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.83 The
facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true when reviewing
the motion. 4 In Boiler, The complaint alleged that Boiler and Nicholas recently discovered the malpractice. Justice Thomas found it
possible that discovery of the cause of action might very well have
been delayed under the circumstances.8 5 He argued that the issue of
tolling the statute of limitations could only be resolved on the basis6
of facts addressed directly to the issue of the statute of limitations.
case as devoid of facts
Justice Thomas described the record in this
87
addressing the statute of limitations issue.
Finally, Justice Thomas believed that by hearing the statute of
limitations allegation for the first time on appeal and rendering a
decision based on the allegation, the court wrongfully denied Lewis
Boller and Alice Nicholas their day in court.8 Justice Thomas would
have reversed the lower court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court.8 9
ANALYsIs

In 1945, Chief Justice Blume set down the rule "that with the
exception of such matter as jurisdiction or other fundamental matters

80. Id. (quoting Mills v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 1989)(emphasis added)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1189.
83. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Paravechio v. Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo.
1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 915 (1988); In re Sullivan's Estate, 506 P.2d 813 (Wyo. 1973)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1190.
86. Id. at 1189.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1190.
89. Id.
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the Supreme Court will not consider any questions which have not
been considered by the district court." 9 Since 1945, forty-four
Wyoming cases followed the rule. 91 The rule was a time-honored tradition of Wyoming appellate procedure. As recently as 1990, Justice
Rooney, the author of the Boiler opinion, stated the principle as,
". .. normally we will not consider matters raised for the first time
on appeal unless they go to jurisdiction or are otherwise of a fundamental nature." 9 2 Nothing indicated that the court would abandon
this rule.
Breaking the Rule
In Boiler, the court allowed a statute of limitations defense to
be presented for the first time on appeal. 93 However, the statute of
limitations issue did not go to jurisdiction or any other fundamental
matter. Thus, the Boiler decision created a rule allowing new allegations to be raised for the first time on appeal.
The majority cited six cases as authority for hearing the statute
of limitations allegation. 94 Of these six cases, three were decided in
the previous century and the other three were decided in the early
part of this century. If the court believed that reviewing allegations
initially raised on appeal was a time-honored Wyoming tradition, 95then
it should have cited modern cases advocating such a principle.
In fact, the cases cited did not support that principle. Instead,
the cases established that if a defense appeared on the face of a
complaint, then the complaint was subject to a demurrer.9 This principle was not applicable in Boiler. First, the statute of limitations
defense did not appear on the face of the complaint, because the
complaint stated that Boller and Nicholas "recently discovered the
negligent conduct." 97 Second, when reviewing the 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the facts alleged had to be taken as true. 98 Because of their

90. Gore v. John, 157 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1945).
91. See supra note 44 and Gore v. John, 157 P.2d 552 (Wyo. 1945).
92. Esponda v. Esponda, 796 P.2d 799, 802 (Wyo. 1990).

93. Boller v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1185 (Wyo. 1992). The statute
of limitations defense was raised in appellee Runyan's brief.
94. Boler, 828 P.2d at 1186, (citing Bonnifield v. Price, I Wyo. 172 (1874); Cowhick
v. Shingle, 37 P. 689 (Wyo. 1894); Columbia Savings & Loan Association v. Clause, 78 P.
708 (Wyo. 1904); Union Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, Nebraska v. Maika, 92
P. 619 (Wyo. 1907); Horse Creek Conservation District v. Lincoln Land Company, 92 P.2d
572 (Wyo. 1939); Upton v. McLaughlin, 105 U.S. 640 (1881)).

95. Perhaps the court does not cite any modern cases, because since the 1931 Ideal Bakery
decision, the court has expressly refused to receive new allegations on appeal.
96. See infra note 117.
97. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1189 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
98. Paravechio v. Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, 742 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1987),
cert. denied 485 U.S. 915 (1988); In re Sullivan's Estate, 506 P.2d 813 (Wyo. 1973).
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narrow focus on the appropriate grounds for granting the now obsolete demurrer, these cases cannot justify hearing new allegations on
appeal which support or undermine a trial court's decision to grant
a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court did
in fact hear the new allegation.99
The court addressed the issue and determined that the statute of
limitations was a valid defense. 1°0 The majority based this decision
on its factual determination that the negligent acts were reasonably
discoverable when the bank closed. 01' However, nothing in the record
suggests that Boller and Nicholas could have known of the malpractice at the time the bank closed. In fact, after the bank was
closed, the F.D.I.C. refused to share information about its investigation with Boller and Nicholas. 10 2 Also, the F.D.I.C. would not release bank documents. 03 All of this suggests that until the F.D.I.C.
filed its complaint against the bank directors, Lewis Boller and Alice
Nicholas could not have known and had no reason to know of the
malpractice.104
In a further effort to justify the new rule, the court cited judicial
economy as a policy reason for allowing new allegations to be raised
for the first time on appeal. 05 In the Boiler case, the court saved
time and effort by deciding the case based on the allegations raised
on appeal. There was no remand and consequently no trial. There
was no second appeal. Substantial court time and taxpayer money
were saved.
However, the problems created by hearing new allegations for
the first time on appeal and resolving the case based on these allegations outweigh the benefits of saved time and money. First, the
court may deny individuals their right to a trial by jury. 0 6 Second,
the only recourse to an unfavorable determination by the Wyoming
Supreme Court of an allegation first raised on appeal is an appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. 0 7 Because of the U.S. Supreme

99. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).
100. Id. at 1188 (Wyo. 1992).
101. Id.at 1186.
102. Appellant's Brief on Petition for Rehearing at 6, Boiler v. Western Law Associates,
828 P.2d 1184 (Wyo. 1992) (No. 90-84) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing].
103. Id.
104. Furthermore, Lewis Boller and Alice Nicholas had not suffered any injury until the
F.D.I.C. filed its suit on August 19, 1989. Lewis Boiler and Alice Nicholas' malpractice claim
was filed within two years from the date of the injury causing F.D.I.C. suit. "There can be
no cause of action until there is injury," Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300, 302-05
(Wyo. 1970).
105. Boller v. Western Law Associates, 828 P. 2d 1184, 1187 (Wyo. 1992).
106. WYo. CONST., art. 1, § 9. Under the Wyoming Constitution, the right to trial by
jury is inviolate. The right to a trial by jury for criminal and civil cases is preserved.
107. U. S. CONST. art. IIl, § 2:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the
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Court's jurisdiction, 0 1 in many cases, there may be no recourse.
Third, the Wyoming Supreme Court like other appellate courts
is far removed from the trial courts. Many aspects of the trial determine whether an allegation is true. For example, the credibility of
evidence and witnesses supporting the allegation are determined at
trial. The Wyoming Supreme Court does not have the benefit of the
overall impression of parties and allegations created by a trial.
Fourth, the new rule allows for surprise on appeal. Allegations
which the other side is not prepared to effectively rebut will be raised
for the first time on appeal. Years of legal reform created liberal
discovery rules in order to eliminate surprise at trial.'09 Allowing the
element of surprise to be a deciding factor on appeal runs counter
to the prevailing legal trend.
Finally, as demonstrated by the Boiler decision, the new rule is
subject to abuse by the court. The rule can be used to protect attorneys and other favored groups or individuals from damaging lawsuits. Yet, the rule can also be used to subject disfavored individuals
to new damaging allegations. It should also be noted that the new
rule may not further judicial economy at all. Assuredly, the number
of cases appealed will increase when practitioners realize that new
allegations may be raised on appeal.
Trial by Jury
Of the problems resulting from allowing new allegations to be
heard for the first time on appeal, the most socially significant and
legally troublesome issue is the denial of trial by jury. Preservation
of the right to trial by jury was one benefit of the old rule." 0 Prior
to the court's decision, new issues or allegations would not be heard
on appeal, unless they went to jurisdiction or similar fundamental
matters."' Absent these special circumstances, the Wyoming Supreme
Court did not hear new allegations for the first time on appeal. There-

Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; -to all Cases of Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls; -to all-Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies
between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; -between
Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens of Subjects ....
108. Id.
109. Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 940 (1961).
110. Statutes which have attempted to grant courts of review the power to hear new allegations and evidence on appeal have been stricken as violating the right to trial by jury. The
Wyoming Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury. Robert W. Millar, New Allegation
and Proof on Appeal in Anglo-American Civil Procedure, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 427, 435 (1952).
111. Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1991); Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. Bowen,
804 P.2d 1292 (Wyo. 1991); Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678 (Wyo. 1991).
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fore, new allegations which necessarily turn on issues of fact were
never heard. Determining issues of fact is the unique province of the
jury. 12 Under the new rule, allegations which turn on issues of fact
can be received and decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court. In
Boiler, the court circumvented the jury and imposed its own factual
determinations.'3
The court stated, "The fact of discovery is not determinative
. . . .The question is whether or not the acts, errors, and omissions
were 'reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period' and whether
or not 'due diligence' was exercised by appellants to discover the acts,
errors or omissions within the two year period.""14 Whether the malpractice was "reasonably discoverable" and whether "due diligence"
was exercised were questions 16of fact."' Questions of fact should have
been determined by a jury."
However, the court concluded, "If the closure was a result of
appellees' negligence . . . such was definitely reasonably discoverable
at the time of the closure ... .""' The factual issue of when the
malpractice was "reasonably discoverable" was never tried before a
jury. By determining that the malpractice was discoverable at the time
of the bank's closure, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied Boller
and Nicholas their right to have a jury as finder of fact for the issue
of when the malpractice was discoverable.""
Also, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied Boller and Nicholas
their right to have a jury resolve the issue of "due diligence". The
court declared, "When the bank was closed on November 1, 1985,
'due diligence' on the part of appellants would certainly require a
determination as to the reason for the closure ... ."19 Nothing in
the record demonstrated that Boller and Nicholas were less than diligent in attemptihg to determine the reasons for the closure *bf the
bank.
No evidence on these two issues was presented to the court. The
court's determination that with "due diligence" Boller and Nicholas
would have "reasonably discovered" the Association's malpractice is
a conclusion with which reasonable men may differ. If the conclusion
was apparent, then Justice Thomas would not have believed that

112. 47 AM. JUR. 2d Jury § 3 (1962).

113. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).
114. Id.at 1185.
115. Fact questions are those issues which concern facts or events and whether such occurred and how they occurred. Fact questions are for the jury. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 593
(6th ed. 1991).
116. 47 Am. JUR. 2d Jury § 3 (1962).

117. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).
118. WYo. CONST. of 1990, art. 1, § 9.
119. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Wyo. 1992).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 8

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

"[d]iscovery of the cause of action might very well have been delayed
under the circumstances." 20 Arguably, by making dispositive findings
of fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied Lewis Boiler and Alice
Nicholas their right to a trial by jury. 21'
As a result, the court violated the Wyoming Constitution. Article
I, § 9 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantees the right of trial by
jury. The right to a jury trial is inviolate in criminal cases. In a civil
case, a trial by jury is guaranteed, but must be demanded pursuant
to Rules 38 and 5(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Lewis
Boller and Alice Nicholas met this requirement. Therefore, they were
guaranteed a jury trial. Nevertheless, in Boiler, the Wyoming Supreme
Court, in resolving the new issues and allegations, made findings of
fact which should have been decided by a jury. The failure of the
court to remand the case for further findings of fact denied Boller
right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Wyoming
and Lewis their
22
Constitution. 1
The great majority of states have determined that hearing new
allegations and evidence on appeal violates state constitutional provisions for jury trial in civil cases. 123 Furthermore, allowing an appellate court to hear new allegations and evidence on appeal generally
extends the court's jurisdiction beyond the limits contemplated in a
state's constitution. For example, a North Carolina statute authorized
the North Carolina Supreme Court to direct and take new testimony
for any case pending in the court. 24 Notwithstanding the mandate
of the statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court realized it could
not hear new evidence or determine questions of fact. 125 The North
Carolina Supreme Court simply had appellate jurisdiction. 2 6 The trial
120. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
121. WYo. CONST., art. 1, § 9.
122. The new rule allowing the Wyoming Supreme Court to hear new allegations for the
first time on appeal raises a more subtle Federal Constitutional question. The Sixth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury in criminal cases. The right to trial
by jury in criminal cases has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply
to the States. In Boiler, the Wyoming Supreme Court did not expressly limit its power under
the new rule to civil cases. The Boiler decision does not suggest that the Wyoming Supreme
Court would be less inclined to apply the new rule in a criminal case. In a criminal case,
allowing new allegations which are based on issues of fact to be heard for the first time on
appeal would be a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as a violation
of the incorporated Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases.
Because Boiler is a civil case, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply.
The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does guarantee the right to trial by jury in
federal civil cases. The U.S. Supreme Court does not see the right to a trial by jury in civil
cases as a fundamental right. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court has not seen fit to incorporate
this provision through the Fourteenth Amendment and make it applicable to the states.
123. Robert W. Millar, New Allegation and Pr'oof on Appeal in Anglo-American Civil

Procedure, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 427, 435 (1952).
124. N.C. CODE § 965 (1883); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-13 (1943).

125. Bank of New Hanover v. Blossom, 89 N.C. 341 (N.C. 1883).
126. Id.
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courts alone had original jurisdiction and the power to receive evidence and determine questions of fact.,27
No statute in Wyoming specifically empowers the Wyoming Supreme Court to hear new allegations or make findings of fact. The
taking of this power by the ourt is less justifiable than if the power
were provided by statute. At least, a statutory provision is the mandate of the people. However, even if such a statute did exist, it would
violate the right, guaranteed in Wyoming, of jury trial in civil cases
and would likely be an unconstitutional extension of the Wyoming
Supreme Court's jurisdiction. 12 Accordingly, the independent action
by the court granting itself authority to hear new allegations and make
findings of fact on appeal is equally a violation of these constitutional
provisions. 219
The Players
Because of the ominous ramifications, the makeup of the Boiler
court is an interesting aspect of the decision. Because Justices Urbigkit
and Golden recused themselves, the majority is made up of retired
Justices, '30 Raper and Rooney, and Justice Cardine.' 3 ' The dissent is
made up of Justices Thomas and Macy.' 32 From what may be divined
from Justice Urbigkit 33 and Justice Golden's 3 4 previous opinions,
there is a strong indication that if they had heard the case, then they
would have joined Justices Thomas and Macy, leaving Justice Cardine

127. Id.
128. WYO. CONST., art. 1, § 9; art. 5, § 2.
129. Goodman v. State, 644 P.2d 1240 (Wyo. 1982). The Wyoming Supreme Court determined that it cannot supersede the right to a jury trial through exercise of its rule-making
power. Arguably, the court should not be able to supersede the right to a jury trial through
its appellate power.
130. INT. OPER. PROC. SuP. CT. l(b)(v).
Under this rule, the Chief Justice appoints members of the judiciary to sit in place
of any justice who is disqualified or unable for any other reason to sit on any case.
At the time Boiler was heard, Justice Urbigkit was Chief Justice. It is unclear from
the rule and the opinion how justices Raper and Rooney were selected. Perhaps Chief
Justice Urbigkit selected these justices or perhaps justice Thomas as the senior justice
sitting for the case selected them. It is also interesting to note that the attorneys
arguing the case were not notified of the substitutions. The rules for the Internal
Operating Procedure of the Supreme Court do not provide for notifying the attorneys
arguing the case of justice substitution. Further, in Boiler, Justices Golden and Urbigkit did not explain why they recused themselves. The rules for the Internal Operating Procedure of the Supreme Court do not require a justice who has recused
himself to state his reasons for recusal.
Id.
131. Boiler v. Western Law Associates, 828 P.2d 1184, 1184 (Wyo. 1992).
132. Id.
133. See Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 203 (Wyo. 1990). Justice Urbigkit's dissent in
Zebre demonstrates a justifiable intolerance for protecting attorneys from malpractice claims.
134. See Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1991). Justice Golden has shown strong
support for the principle that new allegations or evidence will not be heard for the first time
on appeal.
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as a lone dissenter. Thus, the Boiler decision raises the specter of
whether the decision of the retired justices will be honored as stare
decisis.
and the contrasting view of Justice
Given the precedent'
Golden, 3 6 the principle that new allegations and evidence will not be
heard for the first time on review will likely be restored as soon as
possible. Although reinstating the principle would be just, this sort
of action is foreboding. If the Wyoming Supreme Court does reinstate
the principle that new allegations and evidence will not be heard for
the first time on review, then stare decisis has diminished value in
Wyoming. Retired justices can create new precedent destroying past
precedent. Upon their return, sitting justices can overturn the decisions of the retired justices. This lack of consistency hurts the credibility of the court and can only lead to bewilderment for attorneys.
Shaping the New Rule
In the end, if the Wyoming Supreme Court honors stare decisis
and is determined to allow new allegations on appeal, then certain
rules should apply. For example, under the modern British system,
the British Court of Appeal has the power to hear new evidence in
support of or against new claims. 3 7 In cases such as Boiler, where
the validity of a new allegation rests on issues of fact, the Wyoming
Supreme Court should take evidence from both sides before reaching
its decision.
Perhaps, limitations on when the court will hear new allegations
could be imposed. For instance, new allegations raised for the first
time on appeal as a result of lack of diligence in the lower court
should not be heard.' With this limitation to the rule, the court in
Boiler could not have heard the statute of limitations defense for the
first time on appeal. Because the statute of limitations must be pled
affirmatively in the first responsive pleading, the attorneys for the
Association were not diligent in raising the defense. In order for the
rule allowing new allegations to be heard for the first time on appeal
to be applied justly, a system of review different in many aspects
from the traditional American appeals process would have to be
adopted. Standing alone, the new rule does not fit into Wyoming's
traditional American system of review.

135. See supra note 44 and Gore v. John, 157 P.2d, 552 (Wyo. 1945).
136. See supra note 134.
137. 38 & 39 VICT. C. 77, First Schedule, Ord. 58, r. 4.
138. Robert W. Millar, New Allegation and Proof on Appeal in Anglo-American Civil
Procedure, 47 NW. U. L. REv. 427, 431 (1952). See Nash v. Rochford Rural Council, 1 K.B.
393 (1917). This is the rule followed by the Court of Appeal in England.
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CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court created a new rule for judicial
review. The court can now hear new allegations raised for the first
time on appeal. In Boller, the Wyoming Supreme Court blurred the
clearly defined rule of judicial review that new allegations will not
be heard for the first time on appeal.
Hearing new allegations for the first time on appeal is usually
dangerous. Basing a decision on new allegations raised on appeal
denies litigants their right to a trial by jury. Further, allowing parties
to raise new allegations for the first time on appeal reintroduces an
element of surprise to litigation. Failure to predict and prepare for
the allegations that might be raised on appeal could cost a litigant
the case. The increased attorney's fees that accompany increased preparation for the appeal will increase the financial costs. Perhaps more
significantly, there is now a greater incentive to appeal, because litigants may try a case on one theory and appeal it on another.
In Boller, the court does not give a clear and definite rule for
when new allegations will be heard on appeal. The court does not
explain why it chose to break with precedent and hear the Association's allegation that the statute of limitations had run. The court
just goes ahead and hears the new allegation and then decides the
case based on the allegation. In Wyoming, judicial review is no longer
confined to issues raised in the lower court, but instead new allegations may be heard on appeal for the first time. The new power
of the court to hear new allegations raised on appeal is too broad
for the current American judicial system. The new power is unfair
to litigants. The new power has been abused in Boiler and is prone
to abuse in the future.
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